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THEECONOMICS OF RETIRE'IENT BEHAVIOR
ABSTRACT
Thispaper examines the role of economic factors in determining retire-
ment behavior using a unique new data archive on more than 8,700 workers
covered by ten different pension plans. We build on our earlier work by esti-
mating several different retirement models including linear as well as dis-
crete choice formulations. This framework provides new insights into how and
why retirement ages differ across firms. We conclude that older
workers' income opportunities differ depending on their pension rules, which
in turn have a powerful influence on their retirement patterns. In addition
the models indicate that older workers' tastes for income are not uniform,
either across Individuals or across firms.Finally, we show that retirement
age differences are in part due to differences in worker preferences and in
part due to differences in income opportunities. There appears to be some
evidence of worker sorting across pension plans.
Olivia S. Mitchell
Gary S. Fields




Why do olderworkers retire when they do? Although someworkerswithdraw
from their firms when confronted with health problems1 or mandatory retirement,2
an economic explanation, in contrast, puts more weight on the role of income and
leisure opportunities as determinants of older workerst retirement patterns.
The present paper contains several findings about the role of economic
factors in retirement behavior, using a unique new data archive on more than
8,700 workers covered by ten different pension plans. It extends our earlier
work based on 390 workers in a single pension plan (Mitchell and Fields, 1983;
Fields andMitchell,1983a). The point of departure in Section I is an inter—
temporal model in which older individuals select a retirement age from among
several possible dates by comparing the utility from each alternative.Empirical
implementation of this framework requires modelling expectations about future
pension and earnings streams. We do this in Section II. In Section III, various
retirement models are estimated including linear as well as discrete choice
formulations. We test for unobservable but systematic patterns in workers'
preferences for income relative to leisure, and evaluate the sensitivity
of estimated responses to changes in income parameters. We take a different
tack in Section IV, by exploring how and why average retirement ages differ
across firms. This last issue has received only scanty attention in existing
literature, though it is critical in determining whether or not workers "sort"
themselves into firms providing pension plans rewarding early or late retirement
'Cordon and Blinder (1980) provide a careful analysis of the role of ill
health on retirement; a recent review of how health affects older workers is
contained in Bazzoli (in progress).
2Làear (1979) has an interesting analysis of mandatory retirement policy.2
Resultsand policy Implications aregathered in Scction V. We concludc:
1. Older workers' income
opportunjtj5 differ depending on when
they retire, who they are, and what theirpension rules are.
2. Differences in incomeopportunities at older ages influence
retirement patterns significantly.
3. Older workers' tastes forincome and leisure are not uniform
either across older workers withina firm or across firms.
4. Average retirementages vary widely across firms; some of this
variation ISattributableto differences in worker preferences,
and some to differences in incomeopportunities. In addition,
we find some evidence of workersorting.
I. MODELING CONSTRAINTS AND CHOICES
A. The Theoretical Framework
The basic model of how earnings,private pensions, and Social Security
benefit streams affect workers'retirement ages is facilitated bycxamining
Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 depicts the
intertemporal budget set for a worker
contemplating retirement, taking age 60 (orsome similar age) as the starting
point for retirement planning and theplanning horizon as T years. Eachyear
the individual continues to work, hereceives $E in after—tax earnings. If
he retires in year R, he receives$ii(R) in retirement income from private
pension and Social Security in thatyear, and $P.(R,t) in retirement income
I thereafter. The upward slope of the tr functionreflects the widespread
practice of providing higher initial benefitsto a worker who defers retirement.
Corresponding to each retirement date (for example,R1 and R2) are streams of
future pension benefits, denoted byP(R,t). The P(R,t) functions are flat if
pension streams are constant over time;they rise if post—retirement pension
increases are awarded.
The monetary gain to Continued workis best treated in terms ofpresent
discounted values. Let be a discount factor reflecting timepreference
and mortality. The present discountedvalue of earnings is:
1Th1spaper equatesthe date of retirement withpension acceptance and labor forcewithdrawal, which proves to be anaccurate description of most older wrkcrs' behavior in latc'r life. Fora discussion of partial retirement see Custman and Cntn,r(lQRfl -FICUR 1










PDVE = E6 dt (1)
0
This increases with length of worklife R so long as E >0.The pension
structure rewards or discourages continued work in accordance with
PDVP =fT(p+ SS)6dt. (2)
When retirement is postponed, pension benefits typically are higher per year,
but they are received for fewer years. If PDVP(R) is constant regardless of
the date of retirement, the pension structure is said to be actuarially neutral.
Generally, however, neither private pensions nor Social Security are neutral
in this sense. The total payoff from working until a particular age and then
retiring is the sum of PDVE and PDVP:
FDVY1RE 6 dt + JT( + SS )6 dt. (3) o tt a t
The earnings and pension streams depicted in Figure 1 produce a PDVY locus
which increases inonotonically in R.
The choice of retirement age is determined by combining this intertemporal
budget set with an intertemporal utility function, here postulated to have as
its arguments present discounted value of expected lifetime income (PDVY, as
given by (3)) andnumberof leisure years (RETT—R). The control variable
R is selected to maximize
UU(PDVY, RET) where U1, U2 >0,U11, U22 <0 (4)
subject to (3). As shown in Figure 2, the goal is to achieve the highest
possible utility level U* consistent with the intertemporal budget set. The
optimal retirement date R* equates the marginal utility of income from an addi-
tional year of work with the marginal utility of one more year of leisure.
B. Econometric Formulations
Twodifferenteconometric models are used in the present paper to determine5
empiricallyhow responsive retirement ages are to changes in the budget constraint.
The first approach takes the age of retirement as the dependent variable,
and estimates its sensitivity to a paraineterization of the intertemporal
budget set. In particular, we postulate that the PDVYfunctioninFigure.2
maybe summarized by two variables:(1) Base wealth (YBASE), or the present
value of income available at the earliest possible retirement age; and (2) The
gainin the present value of income that would be obtained by working longer
and postponing retirement (YSLOPE). In earlier work (Fields and Mitchell,
1983a), we showed theoretically that the age of retirement should be negatively
relatedto YBASE, ceteris paribus, because of the ordinary negative income
effect. YSLOPE on theother hand has a theoretically ambiguous effect onthe
ageof retirement; a higher income gain from postponing retirement makes the
workerts leisure time more costly (inducing more work), but also provides
higher income each year he does work (inducing earlier retirement).If the
substitution effect doninates, the partial effect of YSLOPE on the age of
retirement should be positive. These hypotheses are tested in Section III.
While the OLS model is invaluable as a first—round approach to the age
of retirement problem, it is also useful to determine what further insights
are obtained from a more structured econometric procedure.An approach that
proved fruitful in our earlier study of workers in a singlefirm (Mitchell
and Fields, 1983) is to model retirement in a discrete choice framework.
Drawing on the pathbreaking work of McFadden (1974), we postulatethat the
i'thworker would receive utilityif he retired at age j, where utility is
comprised of a "strict utility" component for the average person aswell as
a disturbance term which varies across people:
—(cilogPDVY + B logRET1)+
Here ci and 8areaverage taste parameters to be estimated across a sampleof6
individuals.
To close the model, we must add a distributional assumption about the
A common tactic in qualitative choice analysis is to assume that £jj'Sare
distributedindependently of one another and that each has the Weibull






Asis well known, however, this distributional assumption requires Independence
from Irrelevant Alternatives (hA), i.e., the relative probabilities of any
two choices are unaffected by the attributes or availability of other choice
options. In particular, hA means that there is no correlation between C.k and
(k & j). However, in the retirement context there is strong reason to
believe that such correlation may be important——particularly if individuals
are likely to be "workaholics" or "leisure lovers."
In order to allow for this kind of correlation, we propose anorderedlogit
(OL) setup, in which the probability of choosing a given retirement age is
allowed to depend on the attractiveness of the next closest retirement ages.1




Z (eVk + oNk)
k=l
where N =(log(-i)+log(l + P1/P) + log(l + P1/P)) and P is the
probabilityofselecting retirement age k under the hA assumption.plays
therole of a proxy for alternative—specific variation in tastes, which other-
wise would be omitted from the Logit model; its coefficient (a) indicates the7
importance of such variation. Iterated maximum likelihood estimation produces
estimates of, the coefficients of interest, reported in Section III.
C. Data
As is evident from the previous discussion, estimating retirement models
requires that the analyst have complete information for each sample individual
about: (1) the actual retirement age he selected, and (2) the intertemporal
budget set he faced.
Concerning the actual retirement age, many data sets deal with individuals
who have not yet retired. Our data set, a subsample of the Benefits Amounts
Survey developed by the US Department of Labor, avoids this difficulty since
we include only those individuals who reached the age of mandatory retirement
by the time of the survey in 1978.1 As a result these data are free from
"censored spells" problems which plague other labor force modelers. At the
same time, we wish to avoid mortality bias, and thus select the youngest
possible group of workers in the sample——those born in 1909 and 1910. The data
set then consists of 8733 males in ten firms who retired between the ages of
A .-.,I'SQ'F4 4 ...,ls i.1. 1.1.. ..s.$. a....... . m.4.....5=gs
'..iISV%ISWJL I%CI_ C ,,aa, 0e...s,...e. UIS LCD
of retirement patterns, and in addition extends the 390—retiree sample used
in our own previous empirical studies.
The Benefit Amounts Survey is also exceptionally useful for building
the components of each worker's intertemporal budget set. This is because the
data were collected on each worker's years of service, birth year, andretirement
year, and then the individual files matched with Social Security administrative
records and firms' pension rules. The Social Security records provided a
detailed earnings history for each worker from 1951 on2 which was used to im—
'Mandatory retirementages varied across firms in the 1970's; six firms
in our sampleusedage 65, one used age 66, and the rest were later or had no
compulsory withdrawal age.
2Foryears in which earnings exceeded the payroll tax ceiling, we imputed
irf.noftheFox method (1976).8
pute what each individual would have made (after taxes) had he continued to
work between the ages 60 and 68.1 In addition, published Social Security
regulations were used to compute each worker's benefit streams for all possible
retirement ages. For private pensions, descriptions of benefits rules were
taken from union contracts and/or summary plan descriptions on file with the
Labor Department, rendered computer useable by constructing complex benefit
algorithms for each of the ten plans used in the analysis.2'3
II. EARNINGS, PRIVATE PENSIONS, ANDSOCIALSECURITY BENEFIT STREAMS
Theincome opportunities available to each worker at all feasible retire-
ment are presented in Table 1. The perspective taken is a forward—looking
one: we ask, from the viewpoint of age 60, what is the discounted present
value of pension benefits, Social Security income, and earnings available to
the worker if he were to retire at age 60, or age 61, or later?4 We follow
standard practice by discounting each year's benefits by the probability of
mortality at each age, based on survival rate information for the cohort.
In addition future benefits are deflated by inflation and a real discount
rate, assumed tote 2%.
ore information about the construction of the intertemporal budget set
is available from the authors upon request.
2Pension descriptions in effect during the 1970's when sample members
were retiring were complemented with earlier descriptions, used to determine
how benefits had changed during the previous decade. The empirical analysis
below builds in pre—retirement pension increases consistent with what each
plan did during this period; since most plans did not grant post—retirement
increases, nominal benefits upon retirement are taken to be constant.
3The ten plans in our sample cannot be identified individually for conf i—
dentiality reasons; however the sample includes four blue collar plans negotiated
by the United Auto Workers, and several non—union manufacturing and service sector
plans.
4Thecomputationsassume that an individual files for Social Security
when he retires or at age 62, whichever is later.9
TABLE1.
PRESENT VALUE OF TOTAL INCOME (PDVY) AND ITSCOMPONENTSFOR





PDVE 0 7,472 14,825 22,007 28,981 35,581
PDVSS2 28,363 29,339 30,256 31,798 33,196 34,265
PDVPP 22,892 22,759 23,200 22,457 21,717 21,354
PDVY 51,255 59,570 68,281 76,262 83,894 91,200
Notes:
'Benefits are computed only until age 65, because some of the sample plans
had mandatory retirement at that age.
2Social Security benefits are computed assuming the individual retires in
the year in question and files for benefits when first eligible.10
Several regularities stand Out in these data. First, discounted lifetime
income always increases as retirement is deferred. This is a result of higher
cumulative earnings which outweigh any actuarial penalty imposed by private
pension plans, and the Social Security penalty when retirement is deferred
past age65.1 Second, the intertemporal budget set is highly nonlinear. On
average, a worker postponing retirement from age 61 to 62 would gain about
$8700, but for delaying retirement between ages 64 and 65 receives a marginal
gain 16% smaller. This arises because of the underlying nonlinearities in
the pension and Social Security systems and the interactions between them.
Some of our sample plans integrate benefits with Social Security payments,
paying 'tearly retirement supplemental income" until the retiree is eligible
for Social Security. The payoff to deferring retirementis greater for some
ages than for others in all sample plans.
Another important feature of the data is that the intertemporal budget
sets vary substantially across workers. The major source of this variability
is clear from Table 2, which reports means and standard deviation of private
pension income streams in each of the tenplans.2 Differences in years of
service account for much of the variation in expected benefits across workers
in the pattern plans, where benefits are determined primarily as a function
of tenure at the firm.Theconventional plans exhibit somewhat more cross—
worker variation since they include both service and salary history in computing
benefits. The fact that there are differences across workers' intertemporal
budget sets is critical in estimating retirement responses, just as it is
necessary to have wage differences in order to trace out labor supply patterns
in thecrosssectional context.3
'Social Security rules in effect in the 1980's arc somewhat different; see
Fields and Mitchell (1983b).
2Plan 1 was thesubjectof analysis in our previous empirical work.
3Additlonal differences in workers' inter temporal budget sets arise from


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In addition to within—plan incomedifferences,there are
differences in income opportunities. Because the pension structures are quite
complex, it is useful to derive expected benefits for theidentical "illustrative
worker" in all ten plans; the results appear in Table3•1 One striking fcature
is that the pattern plans in our sample tend to structuretheir benefits so
that they actively discourage work beyond age 60. A pattern planemployee
who defers retiring until age 65 will in fact receive lifetime pensionbenefits
which are about 18% lower than at age 60. On the other hand,conventional plans'
present value streams are set up so thatthe worker who defers retirement until
age 65 will receive about 17% higher pensionbenefits than if he left at age 60.
Thus, between ages 60 and 65, conventional plan improvebenefits by about the
same proportion that pattern plans reducethem. In general, patterns plans tend
to encourage early retirement, whileconventional plans encourage remaining on
the job until age 62 and offer a flat payout schedulethereafter (See Figure 3).
We can conclude that in some plans, the present valueof retirement income is quite
low for an early retiree, but rises if retirement is postponed;for other plans,
the structure is reversed so that early retirement isrewarded most highly, and
continued work is penalized by the pension plan.
In the next section we explore how these differencesin income opportunities
across workers and plans influence retirement agedecisions.
FIGURE 3






Lmeillustrative worker is an individual with earningsand years of service

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































III. RETIREMENTRESPONSES TO INCOME OPPORTUNITIES
A.Results from the Linear Model
Table 4 contains a first set of findings on the question of how earnings,
pensions and Social Security benefits affect retirement patterns. We find
that the predictions suggested by our previous research are confirmed
in Column 1. The coefficient on YBASE is significantly negative, indicating
that persons with more base income retire earlier. In addition, the effect of
YSLOPE is positive, indicating that individuals who have more to gain by
poning retirement, do in fact retire later. Sixteen percent of the variance
in retirement ages is accounted for by just these two variables——a high R2
for micro data. Thus we conclude that our earlier regression findings for
the employees covered by one particular pension plan are supported in this
extended sample.
Having established the overall qualitative robustness of the regression
results, we turn our attention to the specific quantitative magnitudes of
the regression coefficients to determine whether the workers in the ten plans
exhibit basically the same quantitative responses to lifetime income oppor-
tunities. One set of tests is based onthe pooled sample. Using all 8733
workers, we introduce dummyvariablesallowing first for plan—specific intercept
shifters (Column 2) and then also for plan—specific slope shifters (Column 3).
In both models we see that the plan dummies are significantly differentfrom
zero by conventional standards. From this we conclude thatthe workers in
different pension plans are differentially responsive to economic incentives
associated with deferred retirement.
It might be thought that in addition to the parameters of the budget
constraint (as measured by YBASE and YSLOPE), variations across firms in
retirement ages might be associated with differences indemographic characteristicsTABLE 4.
RETIRNT AGE REGRESSIONS FOR POOLED SA}LE (n8733)
(t statistics in parentheses)
Dependent Variable: Age of Retirement
(1) (2) (3)
Variable:
Constant 64.17* 64.52* 65.40*
(748.94) (626.56) (125.71)
YBASE _.039* _034* _.103*
(32.71) (24.15) (5.30)






R2 .16 .27 .33
*
Statisticallysignificant at the .05 level.
'Statistically significant by conventional F tests.
1516
of the workers or with characteristics of the firms themselves. Variables to
test these conjectures are not abundant in our data set; for some plans we
did have a few additional descriptors of the workers (race, marital status)
but these had no significant impact on the findings noted above. As for firm—
side variables, we were able to develop dummy variables measuring the existence
of a union, whether all employees were blue collar, whether the firm was in the
manufacturing sector, and whether mandatory retirement parlor toage68 was in
effect. When these variables are regressed on plan—level coefficients estimated
obtained from Column 2 of Table 4, we find that unionized firms have somewhat
later retirement ages and blue collar workers retire significantly earlier,
holding constant the budget constraint as measured here. These findings are
consistent with non—pecuniary attributes of the job playing a role in determining
retirement ages: in particular, unions may increase the attractiveness of
the workplace, while blue—collar jobs are less appealing to the older worker.
Since we cannot yet identify very many of the factors differentiating workers'
retirement patterns across plans, the only available option is to treat these
worker and firm traits as unobservables and to develop models incorporating
unmeasured systematic differences across employees. This is accomplished to
a great degree by means of the discrete choicemodels explored next.
B. Results from the Discrete Choice Models
The jumping—off point for discrete choice modeling is the basic multi—
nomial logit (MNL) model. Because of the potential for differences in unobservables
across firms signalled in the previous section, and because early mandatory
retirement provisions were in effect in some firms, but not in others, we examine
the ten pension plans one by one rather than in a pooled model. Plan—by—plan








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For all ten plans, the MNL results indicate that the income opportunities
for different retirement ages (PDVY) are significant determinants of retirement
patterns. In eight of the ten plans, workers also appear to value leisure
years (RET) significantly. However, before accepting these findings based
on the MNL model, it is necessary to test the validityof its underlying assump-.
tion——the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (hA).
One test of hA was suggested by Hausman and McFadden (1981). It is a
Chi—square test statistic comparing the estimated MNL coefficients from the full
sample with new coefficients obtained from estimating a MNLmodelon a subsample
of individuals who chose a specific subset of alternatives.1 Such calculations
for the subsets age 60 through 65 and 60 through 62, appear in Panel A of Table
6. The calculated value of the test statistic surpasses the critical value in
all but one firm for which the test could be performed.2 This is strong evidence
against hIA: tastes for leisure are not uniform in the older population.
The second hA test compares the predicted frequency distribution of
retirement ages under MNL, where hA is required, with the predicted distribution
obtained from the ordered logit model, where hA is relaxed. By this test,
reported in Panel B of Table 6, the calculated test statistic surpasses the
critical Chi-square value in six of the ten p1s. Thus hA should also be
rejected in the majority of the cases by this second test.
1The Hausman—McFadden statistic is defined as
T— — 0)'[cov(OR) —coy(0) ]°R
—0)
where0Is thecoefficient vector estimated for the full model; 0R
is the coefficient vector estimates among individuals chosing a sub—
set of tne total choice set; cov(0) refers to the relevant parameter covariance
matrix; and t denotes a generalized inverse. The test statistic is interpreted
such that avalueof T larger than a Chi—square critical value rejects hA;
degrees of freedom are computed as
d tr[(cov(O) —cov(0)]tlcov(0R) —cov(O)].
2The test cannot be performed where retirement was mandatory at age 65, or





T Value for Subset*
60 through 65 17.1623.39NA 147.32112.68 NA NA183.4715.24 NA
60 through 62 65.8563.27 111.99 59.72141.89 21.09 NA 58.74 NA33.88
Critical value l0.6(at p 0.005)
A =statisticcould not be computed; see text.
Chi—Square Statistics
MNLvsSOL** 36.72 52.61 1217.25 82.33 12.67 1.74 2.19 427.43




#1 #2 #3 #7 #8 #9 #10
691.650.6020
Takentogether these tests suggest that the ordered logit (OL)model,
in which hA is not maintained, better suits the retirement problem.An
examination of the OL coefficient estimates (right—hand columnsfor each plan
in Table 5) indicates the importance of both income and leisure asdeterminants
of retirement ages. PDVY is statistically nonzero in all ten plans,and RET
enters significantly In eight of ten plans. Theresults are similar to MNL
findings in some cases, e.g., the ratio a/Band the log likelihood ratio for
plan 1/8 are virtuallyidentical.1 However, in other cases the results are quite
different: for plan 1/5, the ratio a/B changes by about18% and the log like-
lihood ratio rises by 16% when going to ordered logit. Inaddition, the fact
that the coefficient (a) is statistically nonzero in eightout of ten cases
suggests that relaxing the hA assumptionmakes a difference.
Focusing just on the OL results, we note thatthe relative importance of
income versus leisure as measured by a/B varies acrossfirms by a factor of
about 2 1/2: from .64 in plan 1/3 to 1.46 in plan1/9. These findings buttress
our conclusions from the linear models: workersin all firms react to income
and leisure opportunities in selecting retirement dates,but they differ across
firms in the way they react to the income and leIsure opportunItiesassociated
with deferred retirement.
Because OL coefficients are rather difficult to interpretdirectly, it is
of interest to compute explicitly how sensitive retirement agesare to changes
• in budget set parameters.Six parametric changes in budget sets are considered:
Change A: Each worker's earnings stream isincreased by 10% of his
base (age 60) earnings amount.
ChangeB: Each worker's earnings stream is tiltedsuchthat earnings
at every age are increased by 10%
'Only theratiosof logit coefficients are Identified, not theindividual a
orB coefficients.-
21
Change C: The pension benefit at each age is increased by 10% of the
age 60 amount.
Change D:The slope of the pension function is raised by 10%.
Change E: The Social Security benefit stream is raised by 10% of
the initial amount.
Change F: The slope of the Social Security function is increased
by adding 10% to every year's benefits.
Estimated coefficients from Table S are combined with these alternative
budget sets in order to determine how each individual would be likely to
alter his retirement date. Changes for the group as a whole are cbtained by
summing individual changes in predicted probabilities for each age.
Table 7 reports the findings for the preferred OL specification in Colurn
1; parallel estimates for the ML model appear in the second co1uin. A 10%
increase in earned income is predicted to increase the average retirement age
by about 0.1 years, or a little over a month. A rise in earnings has both
income and substitution effects, and in this case the substitution response
appears to dominate. In constrast, raising retirementbenefits by increasing
either private pensions or Social Security would lower the retirement age by a
little less than a month, on average.1 Changing the value of early retirerrnt
benefits has a larger effect than altering the gain to deferring retirement,
for both pensions and Social Security. This is because raising only early
retirement benefits produces an incorr effect favoring more leisure consurption;
raising the slope of the benefit stream elicits an additionalsubstitution
response in the opposing direction.
Several conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, we find that for
1Gordon .ind Blinder(1980) alsofind a greater retircnt response to wages
than to pensions and SocialSecurity, though the data set they use didnot













PREDICTED RESPONSES OF RETIREMENT ACES TO CHANCES IN
BUDGETSET PARAMETERS: LOGIT RESULTS
Effectof Change in Budget Set on
Mean Retirement Age, in Years:











every plan, higher earnings would result in later retirement, whereas higher
pensions or Social Security Benefits would induce earlier retirement. Second,
the ordered logit model provides larger estimates of behavioralresponses to
changes in income parameters, as compared to the MNL approach. This arises from
the fact that the CL setup allows nearby retirement ages to be "closer" to the
date initially chosen, than does the MNL model. Consequently, when the budget
constraint changes, the OL responses are on average 30% larger as compared to
the responses estimated assuming hA. Third, the difference that OL makes
varies across plans; looking across the ten plans we find less of a quantitative
difference between OL and MNL than had been detected in our earlier work on a
single plan. This is the only quantitative difference between our findings in
the larger sample and earlier results. Fourth, we conclude that retirementages
are responsive to budget set parameters, but the degree of responsiveness is
relatively small. In general, rather large changes in policy variables such
as taxes or benefits would be required in order to elicit substantialchanges
in retirement ages.1
IV.WHY DORETIR'1ENT AGES DIFFER ACROSS PENSION PLANS?
A. Retirement Ages in Ten Plans
In contrast toprevious sections, the focus here is on retirement age
differences across pension plans, rather than across individuals. That
retirement ages do differ across plans is demonstrated in Table 8: the overall
retirement age across all ten pension plans is 63.7, but plan averages range
from 61.8 to 65.7 years of age. Several explanations are possible: either the
economic incentives for retirement differ systematically across plans, or workers'
This conclusion is supported inour research with other data sets and other
policy reform proposals; see Fields and Mitchell (1983b).Table 8.
Average Retirement Ages By Plan
(R)













preferences f or income and leisure vary systematically across plans, or both
factors may be important. While a larger sample would be necessary for a
thorough investigation of these explanations, it is of interest to explore
the suggestive evidence provided by the ten plans for which information is
presently available.
B.Retirement Ages and Worker Preferences
Our earlier analysis used OL models to develop plan—specific estimates of
the weights workers attach to income relative to leisure (a/s).Inorder to
see whether retirement ages and workers' tastes are associated across plans,
we correlate each plan's ratio of a/ with its average retirement age CR).1
We find that in fact this ratio covaries withretirement age almost exactly,
producing a correlation coefficient between R and cx/ of .94. This finding
suggests that plans that have later average retirement ages are also those
where workers on the average have stronger relative preferences for income versus
leisure.
C. Retirement Ages and Income Opportunities
We now investigate whether differences in budget constraint parameters
across plans help explain plan-level differences in retirement ages. This
issue can be analyzed in two ways: (1) Do plans offering more inome for
early retirement have earlier average retirement ages (holding constant the
rewards from deferring retirement)?, and (2) Do plans offering a greater reward
for postponing retirement have higher average retirement ages (for a given early
retirement benefit)?
Onewayto operationalize both questions is to determine the degree of
association between average retirement ages (i),thepresentvalue of income
1The ratio ct/;wascomputed only where the underlying OL coefficients were
statistically significant. We interpret this ratio as a measure of relative
preference forincomeversus leisure, although it may reflect worker tastes for
job characteristics as well.26
available to an early retiree (YBASE), and the change in the present value of
income if retirement is deferred until age 65 (YSLOPE). For our sample of plans
thecoefficientof partial correlation between retirement age and YBASE proves
to be —.58, and between retirement age and YSLOPE +.30. Therefore we can con—
dude that some of the variation in retirement ages across plans is attributable
to differences in income opportunities available to workers covered by the plans,
thoughnot as much as was attributed to differences in worker preferences.
D.Is There Sorting?
Firmsand workersmay sort themselves according to their respective preferences
forcontinued work. Firms may differ according to the productivity value of
additionalseniority: presumably older workers are less productive per dollar
expended in some industries than they are in others. Such firms would be expected
to creatè.incentives for older employees to leave at relatively young ages. One
way to do this is to create pension benefits that are larger for workers who
retire early. If workers are aware of the differential incentives offered by
different employers, those individuals who have relatively high tastes for
leisure would seek employment in firms offering higher early retirement benefits.
Empirically, this leads us to expect that our measure of the relative strength of
worker preferences for income versus leisure (a/s) should be negatively related
with the pension plan's early retirement income level (YBASE). In fact the
correlation of a/8 and YBASE is —.45, suggesting that sorting of this type does
indeed take place.
V.CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Theanalysisreported here is based on a larger and richer data set than
has been previously available to researchers studying retirement issues.
Of course, the sample should be expanded even further before attempting to27
generalizebeyond this group of employees and pension plans, and we cxpec
future research to go in this direction. The evidence developed thus far
suggests four major findings:
1. Older workers' income opportunities differ depending on when they
retire, who they are, and what their pension rules are. For a given individual,
payoffs to continued work are greater at some ages than at others; in general
private pensions and Social Security appear not to be actuarially neutral.
Even within a pension plan, income opportunities vary across workers as a
function of seniority and salary histories used to compute retirement benefits.
Acorss pension plans there are also large differences: in some firms, the
present value of retiring early is low, but rises if the worker defers retire-
ment; in other firms, the structure is reversed so early retirement is rewarded
but continued work penalized.
2. Differences in income opportunities at older ages influence retirement
patterns significantly. Individuals with more income at age 60 retire earlier;
however, retirement is delayed if the worker stands to gain more by working
longer. In addition, the degree of responsiveness to income opportunItIes
depends on the attractiveness of other, nearby retirement ages. Changes in
earnings have a stronger impact on retirement patterns than would the same
percentage change in private pension or Social Security benefits.
3.Tastes for leisure and income are not uniform either across older
workers with a firm or across firms.The data reject a model that imposes hA
in favor of models which allow for within—individual taste correlation
("workaholism")
4.Averageretirement ages vary widely across firms; some of this variation
isattributable to differences in worker preferences, and some to differences
in income opportunities. In addition, there is some evidence of workersorting:28
thoseindividuals who place a high value on work and the income derivedfrom
working are found in firms which provide greater financial rewards forremaining
on the job at older ages.
Overall, though many factors influence retirement behavior,our work
shows that retirement patterns are closely linked to theeconomic incentives
for deferring retirement. The policy imp],ications of thisfinding are evident:
government practices which alter the rewards for retirement will influence older
workets' labor market behavior in predictableways. For instance, reducing
early Social Security benefits or raising the payroll tax (leaving allelse
the same) would encourage individuals to remain in the laborforce, though
our, results indicate a relatively small response.1
Future research should inquire whether differences inresponse patterns
'identified here are correlated with other worker and/or firmcharacteristics,
'such as health or job requirerrnts. Ourfindings on worker sorting also
'deserve further attention in future research. Evidencepresented here
suggested that firms and workers attempt to structure their pensionstructures
in a mutually agreeable manner. Thus plannerscharged with making pension
policy would do well to consIder how specIfic reforms would alterexisting
structures, and to ascertain whether such reforms are in fact beneficial to
firms and/or their employees.
series of specific reforms in Social Security benefit andtax rules are
exploredin Fields and Mitchell (1983b) using a nationallyrepresentative data Set 011 olderworkers.REFERENCE S
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